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wouldn't want to see Scotland lose that sense of dialogue and dialectic 
that sense of inner conflict, that used to be regarded as the great weak~ 
ness of Scottish culture, but which we can now see, I think, to be its dis-
tinctive strength. 
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"Evil's 
Scandalous 
Logic"1: 
Genocide and the 
Legitimacy of the State 
It's not really a mass murder. It is 
Individual murder, person by person, 
that becomes mass murder. 
-David Scheffer, Deputy Secretary 
of State tor War Crimes 
Hitler's Germany, Stalin's So-
viet Union, Pol Pot's Cambodia, 
former-Yugoslavia and Kosovo, 
and contemporary Rwanda are all 
cases where the use of violence is 
taken beyond the necessities of 
war. Such uses of violence are not 
considered legitimate because they 
violate international ethics and 
therefore are declared war crimes. 
That is, violence neither for the pro-
tection of borders, nor for the 
struggle for independence, nor for 
the acquisition of new land. Vio-
lence is used with the intent of an-
nihilating a particular Other. While 
scholars have focused primarily on 
reactions to genocide, the same de-
gree of attention has not been given 
to the calculated logic behind these 
mass murders, nor the personal-
ized nature perpetuated in these 
crimes. The intimate and dehuman-
izing nature of these war crimes is 
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often part of the logic behind them. How can we explain this logically 
organized, extreme violence in our modern, civilized, and rational 
world of nation-states? Backwardness. Evil. Those of us living in post-
industrial countries believe that we live in a "civilized," "modern," and 
"moral" world and therefore we see genocide as an aberration. Such 
violence is seen as random and illogical. Violence, however, is being 
brought upon people by their own leaders in a detached, calculated 
way, not randomly. 
To write on the subject of genocide as a tool for the creation of a ho-
mogeneous "nation" has been challenging for several reasons, not the 
least of which is the discomfort it brings. My own interest in this topic 
goes back to 1991, during my first trip to Europe, but it has been culti-
vated by many other observations, experiences and professional inter-
ests. Walking through Auschwitz my thoughts ran from shock to 
horror to amazement. What caused the silence and what was the logic 
at work behind the systematic and rationally calculated murders of mil-
lions of people? We in the modern industrialized nations are appalled 
by what we see as evil, grotesque and unjust, and therefore we search 
for a simple answer to put our minds at ease. It could never be that "ra-
tional," "civilized," "modern" humans could execute such a "rational, 
carefully calculated design ... [free of] contingency and chance, and 
independ[ent] from group emotions and personal motives" (Bauman 
91). But that is exactly what happened in the Holocaust and in Stalinist 
USSR and it is happening again in Bosnia. 
This paper is one attempt to come to terms with issues of genocide, 
the state, and modernity. I will begin with a discussion of political an-
thropological theory and the "modern" nation-state. Then I will look 
more particularly at the work of Zygmunt Bauman on the Holocaust 
and Robert Hayden on ethnic cleansing and the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Finally, I will examine the case of ethnic cleansing as 
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Modernity and the cre-
ation of nation-states have by no means resulted in the elimination of 
extreme violence. On the contrary, genocide has been used as a tool by Lead-
ers of modern, civilized nation-states to transform the state through the ho-
mogenization of a target nation, and thereby legitimate the state's power and 
authority over that nation. 
Nations, States, and Nationalism 
While unilinear evolution implies that every culture takes the same 
route and arrives at the same end, i.e., the state, the multi-lineal model 
admits that societies or groups progress at different rates and in differ-
ent ways, but there remains the ethnocentric notion that the highest 
point is still the civilized, modern state. Neither of these evolutionary 
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models help us to deal with the reality of genocide. Genocide, a system-
atic annihilation of a population "in whole or part," seems to be, in real-
ity, a construction of civilization (or states, in the second model). Both 
the earlier unilinear models and the later multi-lineal evolutionary 
models were flawed because of their inherent hierarchical nature and 
ethnocentrism. 
Steadman Upham's edited volume of essays on the unilinear evolu-
tionary model (bands-tribes-chiefdoms-states) proves insightful, 
but insufficient in terms of renegotiating the evolutionary hierarchy. 
All of the authors in this volume revisit the evolutionary model and try 
to find ways in which it can be useful to contemporary scholars. !? 
some degree they are successful, but none of the authors deal specifi-
cally with the nature of violence through this evoluti~nary progress~o1:. 
Though the ability to use force is a commonly recogruzed charac.t~nstic 
of states, the authors here do not examine the use of force to legitimate 
state authority. Most of the authors also continue to talk about. societies 
in terms of their own homogeneity and limited contact with other 
groups. . 
Stephen Plog declares that, "the environment does play a part in se-
lecting social responses that result in changes in political systems" 
(177). He continues by warning that this statement alone ~an lead t? en-
vironmental possibilism and that his intent is to investigate regional 
patterns of change (178). He successfully supports his modes~ goa_I. 
However, even after looking at the arguments of other auth~rs in this 
collection regarding social and political change ~d the evol~tion of the 
state, it is not clear that evolutionary theory can inform a serious under-
standing of the logic of genocide. . 
Extrapolating from theories which support the evolutiona~ model, 
there are several explanations and questions which c~me up. Firs~, one 
might claim that genocide is about the problem of dispute~ territory. 
According to the traditional evolutionary mod~ls, the state is ma~e up 
of smaller polities (tribes, chiefdoms, etc.) which h.ave evolved into a 
new centralized stratified structure. Therefore conflicts over land occur 
with other stat~s, not within the state. This issue is complicated, of 
course, by the concept of nation, which I disc~ss below . . second, one 
could argue that genocide is the result of a classic Malthusi~ che~k~ 
social response to extreme population pressure. Howeve~, if N~ttin~ is 
correct in combining the theories of Malthus and Boserup in~ iter~tive 
model of political and technological evolutio°;, a new question arises. 
How do we explain the fact that, rather than using elaborate technoloS?' 
to feed the population, the Nazis used elaborate technology to extermi-
nate millions of people? 
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Zygmunt Bauman writes of the concern over the use of technology 
for murderous ends in a modern, civilized state. 
Like everything else done In the modern-rational, planned, sclentlflcally 
Informed, expert, efficiently managed, coordinated-way, the Holocaust 
left behind and put to shame all Its alleged pre-modern equivalents, 
exposing them as primitive, wasteful and Ineffective by comparison. Like 
everything else In our modern society, the Holocaust was an 
accomplishment In every respect superior, If measured by the standards 
that this society has preached and lnstitutlonallzed. It towers high above 
the past genocidal episodes In the same way as the modern Industrial 
plant towers above the craftsman's cottage workshop,or the modern 
industrial farm, with Its tractors, combines and pesticides, towers above 
the peasant farmstead with Its horse, hoe and hand weeding. (Bauman 
89) 
Here Bauman also invokes the familiar rhetoric of primitive versus 
modern, rational and planned versus wasteful and ineffective. At first, 
he emphasizes what it means to be modern through this list of adjec-
tives. To emphasize the hierarchical nature of the unique relationship 
between modernity and genocide, he uses phrases such as, "left be-
hind," and "put to shame." Though mass murder has occurred histori-
cally, the uniqueness of the Holocaust (as well as cases of genocide 
since the Holocaust) lies in the fact that it occurred in the "modem 
world." By using the rather banal agricultural example which he gives 
at the end of this quote, he illustrates the mentality of modernity's evo-
lutionary superiority. 
In discussing the nation-state, still more difficulties arise in under-
standing the logic behind genocide. The definition of nation-state gen-
erally requires that state boundaries be contiguous with those of a 
particular "nation" (Anderson; Gellner; Seton-Watson); the singular 
"nation" set in quotes because of the multiple ways in which popula-
tions create "imagined communities" which become nations (Ander-
son). Kedourie claims that the nation-state instead emerges out of a 
movement for social justice. Whatever the purpose of the nation-state, 
nations are typically identified based on a common language, shared re-
ligion, and collective historical memory. The nation-state, as current 
ethnic strife throughout the former Communist bloc attests, has become 
the idealized form of the state. 
One of the problems with the nation concept is the need for a "mas-
sive effort at symbolic construction, of creating a sense of unity, of iden-
tification" (Kertzer 179). Zdzislaw Mach reiterates this idea, but with an 
even more overt political connotation (Mach). Mach states that identity 
formation is a symbolic and dynamic process but also one in which 
power dynamics within the group play a major role (x). Anthony Smith 
claims that modern nations are descended from a primordial ethnic 
1041 
IEvll's Scandalous Logic 
group and that authentic ethnic myths serve the purpose of legitimat-
ing the nation. Katherine Verdery takes a different approach to under-
standing ethnic myths and political maneuvering in post-Socialist 
countries. Through the selective retelling of ethnic myths and the exhu-
mation of pre-socialist cultural heroes, the elites in Eastern Europe are 
constructing and legitimating a new collective identity, not one based 
on a primordial ethnic community. 
Building the Soviet State during the early part of this century offers 
an example of how collective histories and nation-like qualities are ma-
nipulated to create a new identity. Stalin's intentions were two-fold in 
creating the Soviet State. First, he needed to eliminate political competi-
tion from political heretics (those who didn't follow the party line), 
kulaks (private landowners), professors, and others who might oppose 
the new regime (Deker and Lebed). Second, he needed to destroy or 
consolidate homogeneous national groups. Stalin's methods for car-
rying out these goals included: show trials and executions, population 
transfers (separating people from their "homeland"), famine and ~e 
eradication of local cultural traditions by sending children to boarding 
schools and encouraging intermarriage with Russians. One of the ways 
in which anthropologists aided in the homogenization of the "Soviet 
people" was through their work on early censuses: silently inte~a~g 
smaller ethnic groups into larger ones or dividing more vocal indig-
enous groups into smaller ones or consolidating them with sur.round-
ing groups (Hirsch). "It was proof of Stalin's ability as an ad.mirustrator 
that his hold over the party was discovered only when it could no 
longer be effectively challenged ... In this contest he ~ew on ~l the. ad-
vantages of his cold-blooded endurance and supenor craftiness m a 
game where everybody played for the highest stakes" (Von Laue 1~) . 
As an "administrator" Stalin was the highest caliber bureaucrat, m 
I • • 
Bauman's sense of dictating and implementing a plan of destruction m 
detached, rational, and mechanical fashion. 
Anthropologist Robert Hayden provides an illustrative example of 
how the nation-state concept can be problematic: 
The key to the separate nationalist political movements in Yugoslavia 
after 1989 was the explicit conflation of the "nation," ethnically defined, 
and the "state." Although this formulation was hardly new to European 
history, It d id have sinister Implications for minorities in states that were. 
suddenly defined as the nation-states of their respective ethnic majorities. 
By definition, anyone not of the majority ethnic -nation could only be a 
c itizen of second class. (American Ethnologist 787) 
Communist Yugoslavia as a "nations-state" (that is, a true multi-na-
tional state) had been lauded as a success story after the tumultuo~s 
history of the Balkans. However, following centuries of non-democratic 
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rule, the constituent nations of Yugoslavia began to participate more in 
the politics of their own state, a multi-national state. The separatist poli-
ticians who became leaders in the post-Soviet period used the rhetoric 
of the nation-state to define their independent states and bring them 
into existence. This creation of a nation-state requires the construction 
of a legitimate notion of "nation-state." This was especially challenging 
to do when so many families saw themselves as Yugoslavs or w ere 
members of mixed families (Hayden, American Ethnologist; Woodward; 
Denitch). Hayden goes on to say that the winners of the 1990 elections 
rewrote their constitutions following the nation-as-state model, thus 
limiting the participation of non-nationals (American Ethnologist). 
Genocide 
Even the concept of modernity itself is drawn into question when 
examining genocide. All of the examples presented here take place 
within modern Europe. If the modem is rational, civilized, scientific, and 
Europe contains the quintessential modern nation-state, then how can 
there be genocide in Europe? Shock and disbelief are common among 
Bosnians who never expected the violence which descended upon them 
(Rieff; Smajlovic). People considered themselves modern and therefore 
such atrocities could not happen to them. Rieff talks of Bosnian d isin-
terest in Rwandan tragedies as somehow being not quite so incredible. 
That is, the case of genocide in Africa is more easily dismissed as Africa 
is not "modem," like Europe. This is yet another barrier to developing 
an understanding of how genocide is constructed and carried out. 
Genocide is neither a direct nor ultimate result of modernity, rather it is 
a product of modernity (Todorov; Bauman). Auschwitz is not, "the in-
eluctable-if somewhat premature-outcome of modernity, whose 
truth is at last revealed. Moreover, if the term modernity can encom-
pass realities as divergent as democracy and totalitarianism, one must 
wonder how useful the term really is" (Todorov 29). It is easy to d is-
miss that which does not fit into our normative notions, it is much more 
difficult to try to fit the anomalies into our explanation of how the sys-
tem works. 
Yet, the concepts of modernity and the nation-state are closely inter-
twined. 
The permanent and irremedlal homelessness of the Jews was an integral 
part of their identity virtually from the beginning of their dlasporlc history. 
Indeed, this fact was used as a main argument In the Nazi case against 
the Jews, and was employed by Hitler to substantiate the claim that 
hostility against the Jews Is of a radically different kind from ordinary 
antagonisms between rival nations or races. (Bauman 35) 
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Here Bauman refers to the de-territorialized character of the Jewish na-
tion. Primordial rights to land are such a large claim to sovereignty 
among many ethnic groups (in Chechnya and Chiapas, for example) 
that the Jewish dispossession offered "nation" as an exceptional case. 
Bauman claims that this lack of a tie to a concrete piece of land is an in-
tegral part of Jewish identity. Everywhere they went, they were the 
Other. And in the case of Hitler's Germany, this Otherness was used to 
instill fear, distrust, and/ or hatred into German public discourse. 
Hitler set up the image of the Jews as undermining the German nation. 
Thus, he was able to legitimate an offensive against Jews in defense of 
his image of the Aryan nation-state. . . 
Can genocide then be seen as a forn: of ~ationahs~? To some ~x­
tent I would claim that it is a form of nationalism. There is a connection 
be~een the act of genocide and the state-centered construction of na-
tionalism. For example, the Nazi goal of creating an Aryan race, an ex-
treme "imagined community" (Anderson), is a clear exam~le of 
nationalism but nationalism precedes genocide. Conversely, national-
ism is neith~r a necessary nor sufficient condition for genocide. How-
ever I do see a connection between acts of genocide and the process of 
sta t~-building whether or not this includes na~onalism. The use of 
genocide by Hitler or Stalin is of interest because it marks an attempt at 
eliminating resistance, creating homogeneity. 
Definitions are almost always contestable, therefore I will briefly 
outline what I mean by genocide using the United Natio~ definition as 
well as using parts of Bauman's definition. The ~onvention ?nth~ Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was written in re-
sponse to the Holocaust. Article II of the convention defines genocide in 
the following manner: 
.. . genocide means any of the following acts committed w!th intent to 
destroy, in whole or In part, a natlonal,ethnlc,raclal or religious group.as 
such: 
(a) Kiiiing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about Its physical 
destruction In whole or In part; 
(d) Imposing measures Intended to prevent births 
within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group. (Chalk and Jonassohn 44) 
Several of the key words in the definition are "intent" and "or in part" 
which suggests that genocide needs to be neither successful nor c~m­
plete to be considered a crime. Though the authors of the convention 
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specify "national, ethnic, racial or religious group," the victims of geno-
cide could indeed be of a less commonly recognized, though clearly 
marked, group (e.g. homosexuals, handicapped). In terms of what 
qualifies as genocide, except for (a) and (e) the definition is sufficiently 
ambiguous. "Conditions of life" is the phrase which provides the wid-
est interpretation in what qualifies as genocide. Reservations, sub-stan-
dard public housing, and environmental racism
2 
all potentially fit the 
description, though they would remain highly contestable. Even the ar-
guments that genital mutilation and rape in the former Yugoslavia 
qualify as both "serious bodily or mental harm" and " measures in-
tended to prevent births" are contested in the official political discourse 
(Borneman; Stojsavljevic; Stiglmayer). 
The first group of countries to ratify the convention included: Aus-
tralia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
France, Haiti, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippine Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, and Yugosla-
via. In total, forty-three countries ratified the convention, however Ger-
many, Rwanda, and Cambodia were not among them. "If [the expert 
commission definition of ethnic cleansing is] taken seriously, [this] 
means that genocide has been a tool for building a number of nation-
states that are now honorable members of the world community" 
(Hayden, Slavic Review 732). One must wonder, then, whether it is re-
ally significant to look at who did or did not ratify the convention. 
These states may argue that global conditions have changed in such a 
way that transnationalism and globalism are now the norms and geno-
cide or ethnic cleansing are no longer legitimate tools of state formation 
(see Basch, et. al.). 
The United States further specifies in its ratifying statement that 
"mental harm" be taken to mean "permanent impairment of mental fac-
ulties through drugs, torture or similar techniques". Though the intent 
by the US Congress was to remove ambiguities, I feel that the result is 
the direct opposite. "Impairment" can be very severe, requiring con-
tinuous hospitalization, or it can be at the level of having "night ter-
rors" (a common affliction among war veterans). It is not clear to what 
degree such mental impairment must take place. Also, the phrase 
"similar techniques" leaves a very open window for interpretation. 
Again, the role of victimized person's perceptions in determining geno-
cide is not clear when one reads "torture or similar techniques." The 
dehumanizing acts of genital mutilation and forced sex acts between 
prisoners and Serbian soldiers in Bosnia are intended to demoralize the 
opposition, but these acts have not always been recognized by the inter-
national community as a form of torture (Borneman 293). 
In contrast to the definition provided by the United States or the 
United Nations, Zygmunt Bauman's definition of genocide is more de-
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scriptive in terms of selecting the most salient aspects of the UN Con-
vention through the legal rhetoric: 
'Ordinary' genocide Is rarely, If at a ll . aimed at the total annihilation of 
the group; the purpose of the violence (If the violence Is purposeful and 
planned) Is to destroy the marked category (a nat ion, a tribe.a religious 
sect) as a viable community capable of self-perpetuation and defense 
of its own self-Identity. If this is the case, the objective of the genocide is 
met once ( 1) the volume of violence has been large enough to 
undermine the will and resilience of the sufferers and to terrorized them 
Into surrender to the superior power and Into the acceptance of the 
order It Imposed; and (2) the marked group has been deprived of 
resources necessary for the continuation of the struggle . (119) 
Bauman's definition is in some ways far clearer than the highly politi-
cized UN definition. He states at the outset that total annihilation is 
usually not the goal, perhaps questioning whether or not it is actually 
possible. The intent of genocide is to destroy the viability of a marked 
group. Bauman says that, first, the violence must be great enough to 
"undermine" the ability of the victims to resist. This interpretation en-
compasses the qualifications under the UN Convention while also re-
moving some of the ambiguity over the degree of violence necessary in 
determining genocide. When I refer to genocide throughout this paper, 
I will be using the UN definition in the sense of Bauman's interpreta-
tion. 
The Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing 
In his 1989 book, Modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman at-
tempts to show the Holocaust as a product of modernity by revealing 
the precise logic behind it and rejects the general consensus that the 
Holocaust was a "cancerous growth on the body of civilized society" 
(viii). His goal in undertaking this effort is to see what unique contribu-
tions can be made to the study of the Holocaust by sociologists. "The 
Holocaust was an outcome of a unique encounter [which] could be 
blamed to a very large extent on the emancipation of the political state, 
with its monopoly of means of violence and its audacious engineering 
ambitions, from social control" (xiii) . The encounter here is between ev-
eryday factors at play in the modern world. The state, being the most 
highly centralized (or evolved) political form, has, as Bauman puts it, a 
"monopoly of means of violence." 
Though the Holocaust ended with the extermination of Jews, its be-
ginnings were rooted in the purification of the German race through the 
sterilization and murder of handicapped populations (Friedlander). 
The rhetoric of purification (or homogenization) continued throughout 
each new stage of violence against the Jews (Hinton; Frie~lander). ~he 
term "ethnic cleansing" parallels Hitler's rhetoric of a disease which 
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threatened the integrity of the German state. It was very easy for Hitler 
to target Jews because of their migratory history. 
By the very fact of their territorial dispersion and ubiquity, the Jews were 
an inter-national nation, a non-national nation. Everywhere, they served 
as a constant reminder of the relativity and limits of lndlvldual self-Identity 
and communal Interest, which the criterion of nationhood was meant to 
determine with absolute and final authority. Inside every nation, they 
were the 'enemy inside' . The boundaries of the nation were too narrow to 
define them; the horizons of national tradition were too short to see 
through their Identity. The Jews were not just unlike any other nation; they 
were also unlike any other foreigners. (Bauman 52) 
Jews were clearly part of a nation, albeit a divided and migratory one. 
This questioned the entire notion of nation-state. The idea of a "trans-
national nation" was very threatening to Hitler and he aimed to elimi-
nate this Other which he could not define. "In defining the legitimate 
borders of the nation, all kinds of mutually contradictory arguments 
are used" (Denitch 82). This is as true of Germany as it is of Yugoslavia 
(about which this passage was written). In the process of defining a na-
tion, contradictions arose over the right of Jews to live on land where 
the~ had been for hundreds of years, and matters of that nature. By de-
clarmg the Jews a non-nation, their rights to citizenship and ownership 
were eliminated. 
Bauman argues that during the Holocaust there was a bureaucrati-
zation of violence: 
Stalin's and Hitler's victims were not killed In order to capture and 
colonize the territory they occupied. Often they were killed In a dull 
mechanical fashion with no human emotions- hatred Included-to 
enliven it. They were killed because they did not flt, for one reason or 
another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their kllllng was not the work of 
destruction, but creation. (92) 
The lack of emotion on the part of the killers and the "scheme" which 
was being enacted reflects this notion of bureaucratization. Technology 
and science, including anthropology (Friedlander), were instrumental 
in making the killing process detached and mechanical. Planning of 
"cool, thorough and systematic genocide" was made possible because 
"modern, rational society paved the way" (Bauman 90; see also, 
Todorov). The bureaucratic system also successfully dehumanized the 
vic~ms ~f the Holocaust, to the point that every last bit of property 
which nught mark their identities was taken away at the anteroom to 
the gas chamber at Auschwitz (Wollenberg; Bauman). 
Destroying the Other as an act of creation rather than of destruction 
is a very difficult concept to grasp. Bauman more clearly outlines what 
he means by "creation" a bit further on: 
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They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world-more 
efficient, more moral, more beautiful-could be esta bllshed. A 
Communist world . Or a racially pure, Aryan world . In both cases, a 
harmonious world , conflict-free, doclle in the hands of their rulers, orderly, 
controlled. People tainted with Ineradicable b light of their past or orig in 
could not be fitted Into such unblemlshed,healthy and shining world . Like 
weeds, their nature could not be changed.They could not be improved 
or reeducated. They had to be eliminated for reasons of genetic or 
ldeational heredity-of a natural mechanism, resilient and immune to 
cultural processing . (92-93) 
Though I differ with Bauman's use of the term "objectively," I do not 
doubt that this is how Stalin and Hitler perceived their goals. Consider-
ing again the process by which nations are created, Bauman suggests 
that Aryan and Communist notions of inferiority were drawn from 
their perception that reform was impossible for some groups: namely 
Jews, Gypsies, and the handicapped. These "others" threatened the for-
mation of the ideal homogeneous state and are figured in its rhetoric as 
sub-human. Though a genetic argument was not as prevalent in 
Stalinist propaganda, as I will show below, the notions of "purity" and 
"unalterable natures" were common. 
In two articles from 1996, Hayden looks at ethnic cleansing and 
genocide in Bosnia both to analyze how it is used in self-determination 
or state-building and to understand the logic behind it. Against the ex-
planations of ethnic fighting and genocide as resulting from long re-
pressed nationalism, Hayden argues: 
that the wars have been about the forced unmlxlng of peoples whose 
continuing coexistence was counter to the politician Ideologies that won 
the free elections of 1990. Thus extreme nationalism In the former 
Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of Imagining a llegedly 'primordia l' 
communities , but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones 
unimaginable. (American Ethnologist 783) 
Hayden points out the contradiction between the notion of the nation-
sta te, which requires imagining a homogeneous community, and the 
reality of the heterogeneous republics of the former Yugoslavia. The 
"unmixing" (homogenization) was possible because the existence of 
heterogeneity was challenged, made "unimaginable." Ethnic cleansing, 
says Hayden, is a result not only of forcible transfers and murder, but 
also of "bureaucratic discrimination" (784). One of the other bureau-
cratic means of discrimination which directly lead to ethnic-cleansing 
and which I mentioned above was the creation of a nation-state, institu-
tionalized through new constitutions in 1990. 
Hayden's second article "Schindler's Fate," is much more contro-
versial in terms of its acceptance into the academic community (Slavic 
Review). In it, Hayden eliminates the distinction between "population 
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transfers," "ethnic cleansing," and genocide. The degree of violence is 
not of concern, rather the motivations and logic behind it. He claims 
that the efforts by Czechs after the war to expel Germans from Czecho-
slovakia was an intent to destroy the German population "in whole or 
in part" (729) . Hayden makes this controversial statement to lead into 
his argument that, "the crimes of the Holocaust provide a rhetorical 
structure that lends itself to justifying the process that it professes to 
abhor" (730). He argues that many countries have used ethnic cleansing 
to promote their own legitimacy in the international arena and are now 
well-respected states. However, this does not excuse the present vio-
lence being perpetrated in Bosnia. Rather, Hayden takes this approach 
to show that genocide or ethnic cleansing is a tool which states use to 
create legitimacy. 
Such objectivity in analyzing the events during and after the Holo-
caust is difficult to come by and has caused Hayden's work to be se-
verely critiqued. "Schindler's Fate" was followed by several 
commentaries and a response by Hayden (see commentaries by Lilly; 
Woodward; and Wallace in Hayden, Slavic Review) . In the critiques of 
Hayden, several of the authors claim that he is doing something very 
dangerous by ignoring or understating the moral implications of ethnic 
cleansing, population transfers, and genocide. These authors do not 
seem to agree that these terms are all referring to degrees of the same 
process. Lilly goes as far as claiming that Hayden's work is immoral 
and unethical. The other authors agree that such an analysis needs to 
take place, but caution against comparisons which compare different 
regions and different policies. While Hayden is searching for a broader 
theoretical concept to understand the logic of genocide, his critics argue 
that context is the only way to understand the policies and actions in 
each case. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
Recent work on the former Yugoslavia by Hayden has caused more 
than a little tension in post-Communist studies. Hayden, however, re-
mains unwavering in his attempts to come to terms with the logic be-
hind large scale ethnic violence. In this way, his work is very similar to 
that of Bauman as an attempt by a social scientist to understand geno-
cide from within the framework of a discipline which has avoided this 
material for a long time. 
Conflict in Bosnia has brought forth numerous interpretations of the 
fall of Yugoslavia. Some focus on primordial ethnic conflict, others on 
the nature of the violence and the significance that has for the nature of 
the ethnic hatred, but these explanations do not give a clear under-
standing of what is going on behind the genocide (Denitch). On the 
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other hand, there are also studies which take a more holistic look at the 
events surrounding the fall of Yugoslavia. Misha Glenny, Susan Wood-
ward, and Tone Bringa provide such studies. Glenny continually points 
to the fact that it is not merely a pre-communist ethnic rivalry, but 
rather a combination of the romanticization of national pasts, "memo-
ries" of conflicts before and during the Hapsburg and Ottoman reigns, 
the constituent republics and, most importantly, the events of the com-
munist period. Glenny, a journalist, focuses primarily on the commu-
nist period, especially the events which directly lead to the civil/ 
international war. 
... the very mechanism which brought such a swift end to enmity 
between Serbs and Croats In 1945 had been the suppression of all 
national political rights: Serb,Croat,Macedonian,Albanian,Hungarian, 
Italian, Moslem, and Slovene allke. lndlvidual national identity was 
consumed by the all-purpose Yugoslav ideal which enjoyed a strong 
appeal among many for sustained periods of the Tltoist state. (Glenny 12) 
Throughout the early years of the war large numbers of people, esp.e-
cially in Bosnia, still self-identified as "Yugoslavs" and 1:11-any were c~­
dren or partners in mixed marriages (Hayden, American Ethnologist; 
Bringa). Throughout the fighting there has been a need to place blame 
somewhere, to identify and punish the perpetrators (Bauman also talks 
of this in the German context) . However, Glenny also warns that by 
each side using the "atrocities" of the other to justify their own violent 
behavior, the reciprocity of violence will continue. . . 
Susan Woodward argues against the idea that some sort of atavistic 
relations exist between the constituent republics of the former Yugosla-
via, as well. "The Yugoslav conflict is inseparable from internation~ 
change and interdependence, and it is not con~~d to ~~e Balk~ ~;it is 
part of a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration (3). 
She, like Glenny, points out that this disintegration has ha.ppened. un-
der a particular set of circumstances and over a l~ng p~nod of trme. 
However, her argument fails to understand the logic ~ehin~ the geno-
cide. She does not draw any conclusions about the relationship between 
the political disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the use of gei:o-
cide to legitimate the homogeneous nation-states that are to re~lace it. 
Borneman also presents the conflict in the former ::igosl~vi~ as the 
struggle between two modem Western European political pnnc1ples-
"the creation of sovereign peoples conceived as cul~rally homoge-
neous self-constituting majorities within a nation form, and 
homog
1 
eneous self-constituting majorities within a nation form and the 
I ' ' 1 • t t II (276) assertion of this sovereignty through terntonal contra mas a e . . · 
Bomeman's focus in the study of genocide in the former Yugoslavia is 
. "b dil d based on dehumanization, the production of permanent 0 Yan 
I 113 
Metzol 
mental harm" through sexual violence. 
Tone Bringa, an anthropologist from Norway, takes yet another per-
spective on the events in the former Yugoslavia. Her study, Being Mus-
lim the Bosnian Way, focuses on a rural village outside Sarajevo which is 
made up primarily of Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Her account is 
more distanced than the others from the topic of war and genocide, but 
she does this intentionally. Her goal is to show how identity is formed 
among a small population which is confronting both civil war and 
genocide. This approach is still very much a part of the discussion on 
the war as it is one of the few studies currently available on contempo-
rary identity creation by individuals in a time when there is debate rag-
ing over who is allowed to assign identity. Her conclusions reinforce 
the idea that people will continue to determine their own identities de-
spite government attempts to force cultural identity assignments on a 
given people. The kuca, or household, is the center of identity formation 
among the Bosnian Muslims, making identity a very localized phenom-
enon, rather than pan-Islamic or anti-Serbian/Croatian. In fact, villag-
ers did not sharply demarcate the differences between Serbs, Croats, 
and Muslims as their government did. However, she notes that war has 
changed the ways in which people self identify; they are now turning to 
a wider, international Islamic community to define their own identity. 
New York Times war journalist, Chuck Sudetic has written about 
one family and their perspective on the Srebenica massacre in his book, 
Blood and Vengeance. In his introduction to the book he tells of how he 
came to write from the perspective of a single family. After talking with 
both Serbs and Muslims, he "realized [the Serbs'] stories dovetailed 
with the Muslims' and also began with memories of a time long before 
the war, memories of fistfights, funerals, and feasts ... [of relatives] who 
exacted blood vengeance to appease their dead, and who suffered de-
feat and buried their guns for another day" (Sudetic xxxvii). Like 
Bringa, Sudetic describes a very localized reaction to the war and he 
sheds light on the ways in which people lived their everyday lives dur-
ing this time. Blood vengeance in this context is based on generations, 
not centuries, as the popular press would have us believe. Conflicts are 
based on traceable historical memory, often to events that occurred 
during and since the second World War, not on primordial ethnic con-
flicts that stem from centuries old conflicts between the Ottomans and 
the Serbs. 
Several times throughout the book, Sudetic refers to Vidovdan, the 
feast day of St. Vitus. This is the date of one of the most important "eth-
nic myths" of the Serbs. On June 28, 1389, on Vidovdan, the Ottoman 
Turks defeated the Serbs in the battle of Kosovo, a defeat that has fig-
ured prominently in the creation of a post-Communist, Serbian iden-
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tity. However, as the studies by Bringa and Sudetic show, Muslims in 
Bosnia have not identified themselves with the pan-Turkic or pan-Is-
lamic image with which the Serbian elites identify them. This ethnic 
myth is revived at several crucial moments in Serbian history, includ-
ing the Orthodox cries for vengeance in the eighteenth century and the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on Vidovdan in 1914 
(Sudetic). Most recently, on the six hundredth anniversary of the battle 
of Kosovo, the bones of Prince Lazar, who was killed in the battle, were 
taken on a pilgrimage around Serbia as if, "his death would finally be 
avenged and he would be able to rest in peace" (79). Or, according to 
the interpretation provided by Katherine Verdery, the parading of 
these bones had a symbolic value in legitimizing the borders of the 
Serbian State, headed by Milosevic. In other words, this "symbolic con-
struction," to use Kertzer's words, created a sense of unity, legitimizing 
the efforts of the Milosevic government to homogenize the state and 
avenge age-old ethnic hatreds. The rhetoric suggests the e~i~tence of 
nations that for centuries have not gotten along, but the emp1ncal stud-
ies of Bosnia, outlined above, all suggest that this sense of nation is not 
primordial, rather it is something clearly constructed in the present. 
Just as international politicians made a concentrated effort to not 
use the term genocide to describe the events in Bosnia, they are no~ 
trying not to use the term "ethnic clean~ing" to. ~escribe the eve~t~ in 
Kosovo. Many of the stories of separating farmhes by gender, killing 
male prisoners, and burning villages are the similar to those fr~m 
Bosnia, though General Wesley Clark and Secretary General Javi~r 
Solana use very guarded language. In the order to commence air 
strikes, which came on March 23, 1999, Javier Solana used terms such as 
"humanitarian disaster," "humanitarian catastrophe," and "hum~ suf-
fering ... repression and violence against the civilian population of 
Kosovo" (NATO March 23). Other language has also been used, for ex-
ample, "attacks on [Serbia's] own people" (NA~O ,~arch 29) an~ the 
"brutal destruction of human lives and properties (NATO April 1). 
One can find only an occasional reference to "ethnic cleansin~" in the 
text of NATO press releases (NATO April 1). Moreover, ethnic c~eans­
ing was not referred to as something already in ~rogress, rather it ~as 
mentioned as something to be prevented. According to th~ Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the act of 
murdering Kosovar men is murder aimed at a specific ethnic gr~up 
which also has an effect on the reproductive ability of the population, 
forcing people from their homes and burning down villages als~ se-
verely threatens the future of this population. Howe~er, the ter~ol­
ogy of "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" is becoming progressively 
more politically charged in international arenas, as Serbians claim that 
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as minorities outside of Serbia, they are also the victims of ethnic 
cleansing. For these people, rhetoric has fused with a shared historical 
memory and sense of vengeance to serve as legitimation for the Serbian 
government's actions against its minority populations. 
Conclusion 
Within my analysis, I have focused on more extreme examples of 
genocide in order to show how it is used as a tool to construct and le-
gitimate a homogeneous nation-state. I believe that it is an important 
moral and ethical obligation for us to look at genocide in new ways in 
order to understand the logic behind the use of violence in state forma-
tion and to begin questioning "legitimacy" and "power." To borrow a 
phrase from Geertz, we must create a "thick description" of past and 
present genocides. Both Bauman and Hayden admit the difficulty of 
writing about a topic which is so morally offensive, but neither of them 
have shied away from the task. "We are caught in a trap of morality: the 
more actions are explainable, the less culpable they seem" (Hayden, 
Slavic Review 730). And later he states: " ... I need to make it explicit that 
my basic goal was that proposed by Max Weber, 'to recognize "incon-
venient" facts,' meaning those that controvert comfortably established 
opinions, including my own" (767). 
Bauman reminds us: "The Holocaust was born and executed in our 
modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the 
peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem 
of that society, civilization and culture" (x). Both authors provide start-
ing points for discussion, that this paper engages. Genocide is a tool, a 
means to an end, not an end in and of itself. The authors who have writ-
ten about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have all given us different 
windows on how genocide is planned, practiced, and perceived. 
Milosevic has not single-handedly annihilated hundreds of thousands 
of Bosnians and Kosovars. The rhetoric of the victimized Serbian nation 
has been used at various moments in the history of Serbia and Yugosla-
via, but to different ends. Analyses of the symbolic construction of 
power, such as those by Kertzer and Verdery provide useful directions 
in which to push the analyses of the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing by 
Bauman and Hayden. Ethnic violence at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury also raises questions about the nature of state politics as communi-
cations, economies, and families become increasingly transnational. 
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Notes 
1 
A phrase adapted from Milan Kundera's "evil's scandalous beauty" by 
Hayden (Slavic Review 731). 
2 
The idea that environmentally threatening structures (landfill, nuclear waste 
facility, excessively polluting factory, etc.) are located in poorer areas with a 
high minority population. 
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